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"Stay in school" and "stay out of trouble"-these instructions
to children have been a fixture of American society almost as long
as the school system itself. Public schools have long been consid-
ered sanctuaries where mind and body could be developed to their
fullest potential. Indeed, so deeply held are society's convictions
on the virtues of public education that all states have enacted
legislation mandating attendance up to a certain age.1
Although the perception of the schoolhouse as a safe haven
persists, the reality of what goes on inside its walls is somewhat
different. All too often, the school seems to subject its students to
the very evils from which it was thought to have shielded them.
Because "[t]he school has always served as a social barometer, a
t I would like to thank Professor Thomas Rowe for his invaluable assistance and
insights.
1. By 1918, all 48 states had compulsory education or school attendance laws. LAW-
RENCE A. CREMIN, AMEiRICAN EDUCATION: THE METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE,
1876-1980, at 297 (1988). To avoid the racial integration of public schools mandated by
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), some states later repealed their compul-
sory education laws. During the next decade, however, all these states, with the exception
of Mississippi, reenacted their statutes. LAWRENCE KOTIN & WILLIAM E. AIKMAN, LE-
GAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 34 (1980). Mississippi ulti-
mately followed suit in 1987 with a new compulsory school attendance law. See MIss.
CODE. ANN. § 37-13-91 (1990).
Compulsory schooling laws typically require children to attend school from age
seven to age fifteen, but the requirements vary among states. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48200 (West 1993) (ages six to eighteen); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West
1993) (ages seven to sixteen); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3205 (McKinney 1981) (ages six to
sixteen); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1326 to -1327 (1992) (ages eight to seventeen).
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reflection of national historical trends,"'2 it too has fallen victim to
the spiraling violence of American society. Education's reign as
the "the great equalizer" is giving way to its new status as "the
great leveller."
Particularly disquieting is the increasing regularity of injuries
that students suffer at the hands of their peers. This long-standing
problem has evidenced itself in many forms, including physical and
verbal abuse, sexual assaults and harassment, stabbings, shootings,
and attacks on mentally handicapped students. In a recent USA
Today poll of children in grades six through twelve, more than
one-third said they felt unsafe at school, up from almost one-quar-
ter in 1989. About one half of those surveyed said they knew
someone who brought a weapon to school, and 50% also said they
knew someone who had switched schools to feel safer. More spe-
cifically, 43% said they avoid bathrooms, and 27% of girls said
they were sexually harassed last year. A full 63% said they would
learn more if they felt safer.3 Such statistics illustrate that many
of today's schoolchildren are becoming casualties of an educational
system plagued by violence.4
2. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 108 (1969) (quoting Paul P. Molk).
3. See Leslie Ansley, Many Teens Feel Unsafe in School, USA TODAY, Aug. 13,
1993, at IA.
4. See, eg., Robert A. Frahm & Theresa S. Barger, Four of Five Teens Sexually
Harassed in School, Survey Says, HARTFORD COURANT, June 2, 1993, at Al (according
to one survey, four out of five public school children in grades eight to eleven, including
boys, reported some form of sexual harassment); Rob Hotakainen, Schools Quizzed on
Sexual Harassment, STAR TRm., April 30, 1993, at 1B (noting that 1110 incidents of
sexual harassment and another 95 incidents of sexual violence were reported in Minneso-
ta schools last year); Rena Pederson, Young Girls Targeted as Sex Objects, SAN DmO
UNION-TRIB., March 31, 1993, at B7, (noting recent national survey that reported girls
ages nine to nineteen being subjected to pinching, grabbing, obscene remarks, and even
rape by male classmates); Creating Alternatives to Classroom Violence, PR NEwswmRE,
July 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File (reporting that the Na-
tional Education Association estimates that as many as 100,000 students carry guns to
class each day); Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, July 20, 1993) (transcript available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN File) (stating that according to the Joyce Foundation,
59% of sixth- to twelfth-graders could get a handgun if they wanted one; 22% carried a
weapon to school this year, and 39% know someone killed or injured by gunfire). But
see Nightline: Sexual Harassment in Schools (ABC television broadcast, June 18, 1993)
(transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCNEW File) (reporting that some ex-
perts doubt the accuracy of students' testimonies and question the broad definition of
"sexual harassment" used in some polls).
The problem of violence in schools is not limited by geographic boundaries. See,
e.g., Mike Lamb, Block Watch Adapted for Schools, CALGARY HERALD, May 19, 1993, at
B3 ("The notion that schools are an absolutely safe environment has been crushed in the
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Behind the numbers are the individual student victims and
their daily sufferings. One sixteen year old from Houston re-
marked, "You shouldn't have to worry that someone's waiting to
kill you."' Another student from Washington contended, "The
constant threat is 'chipping away at our schools' effectiveness ....
It drains the energy of the students every day."' 6 A Boston
school police officer confirmed that there is an epidemic of vio-
lence: "The few bad kids are the focus of all the other kids' fears
and worries .... And they have a legitimate concern about vio-
lence inside school because some of the people they go to class
with are urban terrorists."7 The implication is clear: "There are
criminals on campus. And one hall monitor, two lunch-room su-
pervisors, and a half-time counselor don't pose much of a deter-
rent."'8
An alarming, but not unusual, example of this type of stu-
dent-against-student abuse is found in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical School.9 In Middle Bucks, two female voca-
tional school students alleged that several male students in their
graphic arts class had physically, verbally, and sexually abused
them over the course of several months." They claimed that sev-
eral times a week they were forcibly carried into the classroom's
darkroom or unisex bathroom and physically and sexually assault-
ed. The alleged abuse consisted of offensive touching of their
past few years.") (quoting Sgt. Lanny Fritz of the Calgary police force); Britain Confronts
Classroom Violence After Teacher Battered, REUTERS, March 25, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File (expressing concern about classroom violence in re-
sponse to 16,000 attacks on teachers in the past 12 months and several high-profile mur-
ders).
5. Ansley, supra note 3, at IA.
6. Linda P. Campbell, Teens Appeal to Officials: Help Curb Violence, CHI. TRIB.,
July 16, 1993, at 2.
7. Mike Barnicle, The Curriculum Covers Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 1993,
at 25.
8. Dan McGrath, School Provides an Education in Violence, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 24, 1993, at A2; see also Elizabeth W. Hall, Schools Unsafe, Charges Father of Beat-
en Teen, THE DURHAM HERALD-SuN, October 12, 1993, at Al, A2 ("They were able to
walk right into the front door of the school, assault someone and leave without being
seen. It's pretty shocking this can happen in broad daylight in a school. They need some
security there. He never knew what hit him.") (quoting the father of a high school stu-
dent beaten unconscious at school by three teenagers).
9. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
10. One of the students, D.R., was considered an "exceptional student" under state




breasts and genitalia, sodomization, and forced acts of fellatio.
They also were forced to 'watch such acts performed on other
students."
During the period in question, the student-teacher in charge
of the class experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining
control over the students and apparently left the classroom unsu-
pervised. The teacher did not witness the alleged acts but ob-
served the use of obscene language and gestures as well as the
physical harassment of female students. In fact, the teacher herself
was also a victim of this harassment. 2 Although the plaintiffs did
not inform the teacher of the repeated acts of sexual abuse, one
of them alleged that she did report an attempted sexual assault to
the school's assistant director. This official failed to take any steps
to remedy the problem. Other school officials and teachers also
allegedly had knowledge of the non-sexual misconduct taking place
in the classroom.'"
The questions arise as to what role the school board played in
connection with these incidents, and, more importantly, what re-
sponsibility it should bear in the aftermath. Under 42 U.S.C. §
1983,14 a federal civil rights enforcement statute, a school board
may be subject to liability when it violates the constitutional rights
of its students. In assessing a school's section 1983 liability, much
will depend on whether it is found to have caused the violence or
sexual deviance taking place under its roof."5 Establishing school
liability under section 1983 is especially problematic when the
person inflicting the harm is a student, rather than a school em-
ployee. Courts-such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Middle Bucks-have recently confronted the issue of a
public school's liability for physical and sexual assaults on school-
children by fellow students. Most have decided that because the
11. Id. at 1366.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Section 1983 provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State.or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
15. See Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.P.R. 1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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school does not directly cause peer abuse, there is no state action
and thus no constitutional violation.16 For such courts, the private
nature of the violence proves fatal to students' constitutional
claims against public schools for peer abuse.
Part I of this Note discusses the necessity of proving the
existence of state action to hold school boards constitutionally
liable for peer abuse. To show state action, victims of peer abuse
must assert that the school had an affirmative constitutional duty
to protect them from private harms. Part I discusses the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Services,7 which governs states' obligation
to protect individuals from private harms. A critique of the state
action doctrine follows, focusing on the imprecision with which it
measures state responsibility. Part I then applies the principles
announced in DeShaney to the school context. Arguing that the
public school assumes a constitutional duty to protect its students,
it concludes that school attendance is a form of "custody" under
both the legal and functional definitions of the term. Part II of
this Note then examines the requirements for a section 1983 cause
of action and how courts have interpreted them to bar virtually all
claims against a school board.
This Note argues that schools should bear responsibility for
incidents of serious peer abuse, even. if they are not the "direct"
cause of the harm. Requiring school attendance confines students
through an assertion of legal authority. Such confinement exposes
children to peer abuse and may render them less capable of pro-
tecting themselves from such abuse. Consequently, students are
both legally and functionally in the school's custody and have a
constitutional right to be protected. Thus, the private nature of
peer abuse should not necessarily preclude public responsibility.
Finally, this Note recommends that school boards should be held
constitutionally liable for their de facto policies of inaction towards
peer abuses.
16. See infra notes 38, 57 and accompanying text.
17. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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I. FINDING A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO PROTECTION
For victims of abuse in public schools, whether at the hands
of a student or a school employee, three areas of redress are
potentially available: an action in tort under applicable state law; a
sexual discrimination claim under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972;" or a claim of substantive due process
violation alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although each repre-
sents an important source of recovery, it is the section 1983 reme-
dy that has attracted the most attention.' 9
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action to those
whose constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated
by people acting under color of state law? The statute creates
no substantive rights of its own but provides a vehicle for enforce-
ment of rights already guaranteed by the Constitution or by feder-
al law.2' Accordingly, for a section 1983 action to lie, a violation
18. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). Title IX provides, in pertinent part, "No person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." Id. § 1681(a). Title IX defines an educational
institution as "any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education." Id. § 1681(c).
The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that students may recover money damages
for violations of Title IX. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028,
1038 (1992); see also Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School
Liability Under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (1993)
(advocating the expansion of Title IX protections to encompass student-to-student sexual
harassment).
19. The wisdom of pursuing a state common law, as compared to a federal statutory
remedy, often depends on the existence of sovereign immunity. In states in which sover-
eign immunity has been either limited or abolished, common law tort actions provide an
adequate remedy for many of the injuries that plaintiffs in other states would pursue
under § 1983. In those states in which broad sovereign immunity is still in effect, howev-
er, common law tort actions are not available, creating the need for some alternative
federal avenue of redress.
Section 1983 offers some unique advantages over state tort actions, including a
wider range of federal, constitutional, and statutory rights that may be implicated by
school misconduct; a broader range of potential defendants, including not only the actor,
but supervisors, board members, and school entities; more generous federal law damages
standards; and the possibility of recovering costs and attorneys' fees for prevailing plain-
tiffs. William D. Valente, Liability for Teacher's Sexual Misconduct with Students-Closing
and Opening Vistas, 74 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1021, 1022 n.4 (1992).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the relevant text of § 1983, see supra note 14.
21. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); Chapman v. Houston Wel-
fare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 568 (1871) (statement of Senator Edmonds)); Wideman v. Shallowford Community
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of an underlying federal right must first be established and be
shown to have taken place "under color of [state] law."' In the
context of peer-on-peer abuse, the plaintiff alleges that the school
board's action (or inaction) caused a deprivation of his Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights. In a 1961 case, Mon-
roe v. Pape,' the U.S. Supreme Court specifically interpreted
section 1983 as allowing a remedy for Fourteenth Amendment
deprivations caused by a state official's abuse of his position.24
A. Proving an Underlying Due Process Violation
School board liability under section 1983 for peer abuses
requires the plaintiff to establish a constitutional violation of her
due process fights under color of state law.' In cases of school
abuse, the c6nstitutional right at stake is the substantive due pro-
cess right of bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.' However, a due-process violation will be
found only if the plaintiff shows that his injury resulted from state
actionY Although courts have found state action to be satisfied
when a school employee assaults a student, they have been
Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987).
22. Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1032.
23. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
24. Id. at 172. Largely as a result of the Court's decision in Monroe, § 1983 evolved
as the equivalent of a Fourteenth Amendment civil action for damages. Sheldon Nahmod,
Section 1983 Discourse: The Move From Constitution to Tort, 77 GEo. LJ. 1719, 1722
(1989).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
26. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g granted,
987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993).
27. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883).
28. See, e.g., Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1991); J.0. v.
Alton Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990); Stoneking v. Bradford
Area Sch. Dist. (Stoneking I1), 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044
(1990).
Even when constitutional liberty interests are implicated, however, not all bodily
injuries caused by state actors give rise to municipal liability. Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Although by proving an underlying constitutional
violation, the victim may have an action against the specific employee responsible, more
must be shown before a § 1983 action will lie against the school's administration or
board. The plaintiff must additionally prove that the school administration in some way
caused her injury-that it too violated her constitutional rights by failing to protect her
from the teacher's abuse. Consequently, the plaintiff must establish that the school board
maintained a policy of deliberate indifference towards safety violations. See infra text
accompanying notes 123-34.
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much more reluctant to do so for injuries caused by other stu-
dents. Very often, then, the public or private nature of the injury
will ultimately determine whether the abuse suffered constitutes a
due process violation.
For example, in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District,29
a school employee abuse case, a student brought a section 1983
action against the school after the school's band director sexually
molested her.30 On remand, the Third Circuit held that the
school district could be held liable for maintaining policies that
were deliberately indifferent to the teacher's sexual abuse.3 The
court also held that evidence that school supervisors discouraged
and minimized reports of the teacher's sexual misconduct could
lead a jury to infer a policy of condoning such behavior.32 Impor-
tantly, the court considered the teacher's abuse of the child to
constitute the necessary underlying violation: "A teacher's sexual
molestation of a student is an intrusion of the schoolchild's bodily
integrity... under the Due Process Clause .... ""
The inadequacy of, a pure Stoneking theory of liability for
peer abuse cases is born out in Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School
District?' In Dorothy J., the plaintiff, Brian B., attempted to hold
the school board liable after a fellow student sexually molested
and raped him. At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was at-
tending a special program for the mentally handicapped at a local
29. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist. (Stoneking ), 856 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988),
vacated sub nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989), on remand sub nom.
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist. (Stoneking I), 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
30. Stoneking II was the first case to apply the "deliberate indifference" standard of
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), to schools. See Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at
725-26 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-89).
31. Id. at 724-25. The court considered state action to be a requisite for liability and
found that requirement to be satisfied because the violation was committed by the
school's band director.
32. Id. at 730-31. Some courts have been unwilling to impute reckless indifference to
school officials even in the face of overwhelming evidence of abuse. See, e.g., Thelma D.
v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that the school board's
failure to remove a teacher in the face of five previous complaints of sexual abuse over
a sixteen-year period was not actionable under § 1983 absent a showing that it had
knowledge of the teacher's unconstitutional misconduct or maintained inadequate proce-
dures for addressing cases of abuse).
33. Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 727.
34. 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), affd, No. 92-2452, 1993 WL 406464 (8th
Cir. Oct. 6, 1993).
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high school 5 In refusing to hold various government agencies
liable, the court remained unpersuaded by the theory used in
Stoneking that the school's policies and customs directly caused
the constitutional injury.36 The principal distinction it drew was
that Brian B.'s injuries resulted from another student's actions,
rather than those of a school employee.37 According to the court,
the case "lacked the linchpin of Stoneking II, namely, an underly-
ing violation by a state actor. ' 38
The court's holding implies that to establish the necessary
constitutional violation, victims of peer abuse must assert that the
school had a constitutional duty to protect students' liberty inter-
ests from private harms. Only by establishing such a duty will the
child be able to prove that an underlying due process violation has
occurred. Whether a protective duty applies to schools is a ques-
tion that has divided lower courts. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court has never addressed this question, it did consider the broad-
er issue of affirmative constitutional duties in a seminal decision,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.39
B. The DeShaney Watershed
DeShaney, a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision, is controlling
on the general question of an individual's right to receive govern-
ment protection against due process invasions by private actors.'
35. Id. at 1407.
36. Id. at 1409-10.
37. Id. at 1409.
38. Id. at 1410; see also Hunter v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 714, 721
(M.D. Pa. 1993) (finding school was not liable under Stoneking 11 for the death of a
special education student at the hands of other students since no state action was in-
volved); Elliot v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 823 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
("[Flor a court to impose § 1983 liability for the state's policy, custom, or practice, the
underlying violative acts must have been committed by state officials . . . . '[S]ection
1983 liability may not be ...[imposed] where private actors committed the underlying
violative acts.'" (quoting D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., Nos.
91-1136, 91-1137, 1991 WL 276292, affd on reh'g, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en
banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993)) (alteration in original); Doe v. Douglas Coun-
ty Sch. Dist. RE-i, 770 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding that the school may
have had a policy, custom, or practice that caused the plaintiff's harm when the school
psychologist sexually molested the plaintiff); Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.P.R.
1990) ("[T]he determining factor in this case is that the death ... was caused solely by
a private individual.").
39. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
40. For other discussions of DeShaney, see Laura Oren, The State's Failure To Pro-
tect Children and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659
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In DeShaney, the state Department of Social Services received
several reports that a four-year-old boy, Joshua, was being abused
by his father but failed to remove him from the father's custody.
Shortly thereafter, the father beat Joshua so severely that the child
suffered permanent brain damage, rendering him retarded and
requiring his institutionalization for life. Through his mother, Josh-
ua sued the caseworkers and the agency for violating his substan-
tive due process right to liberty by failing to protect him from his
father.4'
The DeShaney Court held that the state's failure to protect
the child did not violate his substantive due process rights because
there is no constitutional guarantee against private violence.'
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
although the Due Process Clause forbids the state itself from
infringing on civil liberties, it does not impose "an affirmative
obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come
to harm through other means."'43
Although denying any state liability in the case before it, the
DeShaney Court nevertheless conceded that a duty of protection
might arise out of certain "special relationships" between the state
and particular individuals.4 Joshua had contended that "because
the State knew that [he] faced a special danger of abuse ... and
specifically proclaimed ... its intention to protect him against that
danger," a special relationship was created that imposed an affir-
mative duty on the state to protect him.' The Court squarely
(1990); Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward Children Under a Post-
DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 227 (1990); Kristen L. Davenport, Note,
Claims of Abused Children Against State Protective Agencies-The State's Responsibility
After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 243 (1991); Lynne J. Stem, Comment, Young Lives Betrayed: DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 25 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1251 (1991);
Benjamin Zipursky, Note, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1101 (1990).
41. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the state's fail-
ure to remove Joshua from his home, despite the knowledge of social workers that
Joshua's father was severely abusing him, constituted a deprivation of his substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
42. Id. at 195, 202.
43. Id. at 195. Chief Justice Rehnquist's historical analysis of the Due Process Clause
is a classic articulation of the "charter of negative liberties" theory of the Constitution.
See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
44. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-99.
45. Id. at 197.
19931
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:588
rejected this contention. It concluded that the state's knowledge of
a third-party danger and its willingness to aid could not serve as a
basis for a special relationship.' The only instance in which the
Court explicitly recognized a special relationship involved situa-
tions of state custody 7 Drawing on two prior decisions, Estelle v.
Gambles and Youngberg v. Romeo,4 9 the DeShaney Court con-
cluded that "when the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it
a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being."5 Falling under this exception are prison-
ers and involuntarily committed mental patients, who are entitled
to a duty of protection based on the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment and the substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
respectively. For prisoners, this duty entitles them to protection
from violent acts committed by either the state or fellow in-
mates. 1 Institutionalized mental patients also are guaranteed safe
conditions of confinement 2 In carving out this exception, howev-
er, the Court was careful to narrow its application to instances in
which the state's custody of an individual involuntarily has de-
prived him of his liberty and ability to care for himself.5 3
46. Id. at 201-02. According to the Court, the origin of this "mistaken" idea can be
traced back to the Supreme Court's opinion in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277
(1980). DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-98 n.4. In Martinez, the Court was confronted with
the issue of "whether state officials could be held liable under the Due Process
Clause ... for the death of a private citizen at the hands of a parolee." In dicta, the
Court pointed to the fact that the parole board was not aware that the decedent faced
any special danger as an additional reason for denying the plaintiffs claim. Id. (citing
Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285). Several courts of appeals subsequently interpreted this lan-
guage to mean that once the state learns of a danger to an identified victim and indi-
cates a willingness to provide protection, a special relationship is created that gives rise
to an affirmative duty. Id
47. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-200. By adopting a bright-line custody rule, DeShaney
ostensibly brought certainty to substantive due process cases involving state unresponsive-
ness. Statutory responsibilities, knowledge of danger, willingness to help, likelihood of
prevention, and special relationships other than those arising from custody all became
extrinsic concerns.
48. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
49. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
50. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
51. See eg., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 361-63 (3d Cir. 1992).
52. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199.
53. Id. at 199-200.
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The DeShaney court ultimately held that the Estelle-
Youngberg line of analysis was not applicable to Joshua's circum-
stances.5 4 Because he was not in the state's custody at the time
of injury, the situation did not fall within the rubric of the special
relationship exception5 The court distinguished Joshua's plight
from that of a foster child, whose situation the Court felt might be
sufficiently analogous to incarceration to trigger an affirmative
duty to protect. It left open the possibility that the state could be
held liable for failing to protect children from mistreatment by
their foster parents
5 6
C. The False Distinction Within the State Action Doctrine
When a student is assaulted by a fellow student, most courts
have refused to hold the state responsible under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The direct cause of the
injury is a private actor, not a public employee. This distinction
between state action and inaction addresses the concern that the
government be held responsible only when it or one of its own
agents- has caused the harm in question. Still, the state action-
inaction distinction does not always effectuate this policy concern.
Does a seeming lack of state action automatically translate into a
lack 'of state responsibility? Or can the state still bear some re-
sponsibility even in cases in which the immediate cause of the
injury cannot be directly attributed to it?
The thrust of DeShaney is that the state is under no affirma-
tive obligation to protect individuals from private harms. This view
comports with a reading of the Due Process Clause as requiring
only that the state refrain from violating citizens' constitutional
rights.58 Such an understanding reflects the notion that the Con-
54. Id. at 201. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[w]hile the State may have
been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their
creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them." Id. This
statement seems to equate the absence of custody with the absence of any wrongdoing
on the state's part. Thus, the Court insisted that the state neither abused its power nor
placed Joshua in a worse position than he would have been in had it not acted at all by
returning him to his father's custody. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 201 n.9.
57. See, e-g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364
(3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993); Russell v. Fannin County
Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir. 1992).
58. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State
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stitution is simply a "charter of negative liberties."59 Under this
strict interpretation, the state has no positive duty to protect citi-
zens against harms caused by private actors.
The tendency of courts to decide affirmative duty questions
on the basis of state action has been sorely criticized. Much of this
dissatisfaction comes out of recognition that the distinction be-
tween action and inaction is highly malleable. In short, the con-
cern is that "it is possible to restate most actions as corresponding
inactions with the same effect, and to show that inaction may have
the same effects as a forbidden action., 6' A neat division be-
tween the two characterizations is therefore impossible. 1
In addition, much of the judicial resistance towards recogniz-
ing an affirmative duty absent state action arises out of fear of the
"slippery slope"-that any such recognition is the first step to-
wards the evils of big government and a general constitutional
"duty to provide basic services." 6 Implicit in the slippery slope
argument is the concession that imposing a duty on the govern-
ment in the case at hand would not be objectionable. Rather, the
concern is with the judges' and jurors' ability in future cases to
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
• 59. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The Constitution is a
charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the
federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as
maintaining law and order.").
60. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989).
61. An examination of other constitutional guarantees further supports the conclusion
that the action-inaction distinction is unhelpful. Even the most negatively phrased consti-
tutional duties may be discharged solely through positive government exertions. Although
the First Amendment demands only that "Congress shall make no law" abridging free
speech rights, the mere failure to enact laws curtailing speech does not absolve the gov-
ernment of its duty to protect freedom of speech. It may be required to expend resourc-
es and provide access to public forums to comply with the constitutional mandate of free
speech. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MiCH. L. REV. 2271,
2282 (1990). The Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable search and sei-
zure is intended to prevent the government from interfering in citizens' private affairs.
The government can arguably fulfill this mission only by taking affirmative steps to ob-
tain warrants based on probable cause. Another example is the Fifth Amendment's guar-
antee against self-incrimination and freedom from government coercion. Id. To ensure
that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself," U.S. CONST. amend. V., the government is obliged to warn the accused of his
rights.
62. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Government Inaction as a Constitutional
Tort DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REv. 107, 132 (1991) (quoting Jackson
v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984)).
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discern instances in which governmental protection is appropri-
ate.6
Moreover, apart from its questionable underpinnings, the state
action test is unworkable because it is subject to arbitrary applica-
tion. In asking whether the state has acted to deprive a person of
his rights, the test requires the court to choose a time frame for
its review. Consequently, whether the state is said to have acted
largely depends on how far back in the chain of events a court is
willing to look. 4 The frame of reference chosen is central to the
court's disposition of a plaintiff's due process claim. By limiting its
focus to the period in which the sexual abuse took place, courts
are able to conclude that no due process violation has occurred
since the school has taken no action causally related to the inju-
ries during that time. Under an expanded frame of reference,
however, including the period prior to the immediate infliction of
the injury, the school has acted in a number of ways towards its
students that make the custody rule espoused in DeShaney rele-
vant for state action purposes. By taking a person into custody
and holding him against his will, the state assumes a constitutional
duty to provide for his safety.' Such actions by the state also
satisfy the state action requirement for constitutional torts. The
question is thus whether compulsory school attendance is a form
of custody sufficient to invoke the exception.
D. DeShaney Goes to School: The School as a Custodial Environ-
ment
The Constitution imposes on the state an affirmative duty of
protection when a special relationship exists between it and par-
ticular individuals.66 The DeShaney Court was careful to limit the
finding of such a duty to instances in which the state has taken a
person involuntarily into its custody, thus rendering him unable (o
care for himself.67 Although the state does not regularly assume
63. Id. at 132-33. The logic underlying the slippery slope argument is that by enforc-
ing only a negative government duty to avoid direct harm, courts can sidestep such
thorny issues as causation, motivation, duty, and the allocation of governmental and judi-
cial resources.
64. Bandes, supra note 61, at 2281.
65. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989).
66. Id. at 197-99.
67. Id. at 199-200.
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an affirmative obligation to protect people from private harms, an
exception exists for situations of state custody.
Whether a public school constitutes a custodial setting for
protective duty purposes has yet to be definitively decided. In J.0.
v. Alton Community Unit School District 11,6 for example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to impose
an affirmative duty of care on the school under the custody excep-
tion set out in DeShaney.69 In denying section 1983 relief to a
student who had been sexually abused by a teacher, the court
found the compelled attendance of students to be much less debil-
itating than the confinement of prisoners and mental patients."0
In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,71 however, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did impose an affirma-
tive constitutional duty on the school's superintendent and princi-
pal to protect students from substantive due process violations. In
Doe, a high school student brought a section 1983 civil rights suit
against various school personnel after her teacher engaged her in
68. 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990).
69. The Third and Tenth Circuits agree with the Seventh Circuit that a public school
does not constitute a custodial environment for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., Maldonado
v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that "compulsory attendance laws in
no way restrain a child's liberty so as to render the child and his parents unable to care
for the child's basic needs"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (requiring
children to attend school does not create a custodial relationship within the meaning of
DeShaney), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993); see also Robbins v. Maine Sch. Admin.
Dist. No. 56, 807 F. Supp. 11, 13 (D. Me. 1992) (finding that the relationship between a
state and its students is not a special custodial relationship as described in DeShaney);
Doe v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-I, 770 F. Supp. 591, 593-94 (D. Colo. 1991) (con-
cluding that a public school did not have special relationship with a student so as to
impose affirmative duty on the school to protect the student from sexual abuse by the
school psychologist); cf. C.M. v. Southeast Delco School Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179, 1189-90
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that a school district's affirmative duty to protect its students
from teacher abuse derives not from its custody of students but from its obligations to
supervise the conduct of its teachers); K.L. v. Southeast Delco School Dist., 828 F. Supp.
1192, 1195-96 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (clarifying the holding in C.M. that the state has an affir-
mative duty to protect its students from the abusive conduct of teachers, rather than all
state employees).
70. As one court noted,
By mandating school attendance for children under the age of sixteen, the
state ... has not assumed responsibility for their entire personal lives; these
children and their parents retain substantial freedom to act. The analogy of a
school yard to a prison may be a popular one for school-age children, but we
cannot recognize constitutional duties on a child's lament.
J.O., 909 F.2d at 272.
71. 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993).
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repeated episodes of sexual intercourse during her freshman and
sophomore years.72 After recognizing the child's constitutional
right to be fre& from sexual molestation, the court found that the
school had assumed a duty to protect its students by virtue of
Texas's compulsory education statute and the school's in loco
parentis status.73 Harkening back to the "deprivation of liberty"
test espoused in DeShaney, the court held,
Inasmuch as a state acquires a duty. to protect an individual
when it "render[s] that individual unable to act for himself," so
too does the state acquire a duty to protect a child when it ren-
ders the guardian of that child powerless to act on the child's
behalf. So, when the state has in some significant way separated
the child from the persons otherwise responsible for taking pre-
cautions to shield the child from the social milieu, the state as-
sumes a corresponding duty to provide that protection, for a
child is ordinarily incapable of fending for himself.74
Assuming that a duty of protection has in fact been found, school
personnel must still be shown to have intentionally breached this
duty before the Due Process Clause is implicated.75 Thus, mere
negligence by schools towards sexual or physical abuse is insuffi-
cient to create a due process violation.76
72. Id. at 139-41.
73. In loco parentis describes the authority vested in schools to assume a parental
role with respect to students for educational purposes. See Black's Law Dictionary 787
(6th ed. 1990) ("In the place of a parent").
74. Id. at 146 (citation omitted) (quoting Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1144
(3d Cir. 1990)); see also Waechter v. School Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1007-09
(W.D. Mich. 1991) (finding that a custodial relationship existed when a handicapped
student died after being forced to run 350 yards in less than two minutes as punishment
for talking with another classmate).
75. The degree of fault required to establish a constitutional violation is distinct from
the deliberate indifference required for municipal liability. See City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388 n.8 (1989).
76. In the 1986 companion cases of Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)
and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court asserted
that mere negligence by a state official is insufficient to deprive a person of his liberty
or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Daniels and Davidson dealt with viola-
tions of procedural due process. Although the Supreme Court has left open the question
of what culpability threshold will trigger substantive due process violations, lower courts
have generally decided that conduct beyond mere negligence is required. See,. eg.,
Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting "deliber-
ate indifference" or "reckless indifference" as the level of culpability that pretrial
detainees must establish for violations of their personal security interests under the Four-
teenth Amendment), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 972 (1992). Questions of culpability often
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In recognizing a custody exception, the DeShaney Court did
not expressly enumerate the factors to be -used in deciding what
constitutes custody. The question thus becomes what stan-
dards-legal or functional-should be employed to determine
whether custody exists. Under a legal definition of custody, a
person is taken into custody when he is confined under an assert-
ed legal authority.' Under a functional definition, the inquiry
centers on whether the state has exposed the individual to add-
itional risk and increased her dependence on state protection.78
Both approaches provide insight into whether the relationship
between schools and students rises to the level of custody.
1. The Legal Custody Perspective. A school's legal authority
to confine its students originates partly from its designated in loco
parentis status. Parents do not voluntarily confer this authority on
school officials; rather, it is publicly mandated by local educational
statutes.79 At the heart of society's "family values" lies the recog-
nition that a "child generally depends on his parents to guard
against the dangers of his surroundings."'  Some courts have re-
lied on this notion to impose a similar protective obligation on the
state when it has stepped into the role of a parent.1
turn on whether a public agent had knowledge or notice of the alleged injury. Thus, a
school official's state of mind may very well be determinative of whether a constitutional
remedy will be awarded in a due process case.
State-of-mind requirements present certain advantages to courts with conservative
agendas. First, due process guarantees may be expanded or contracted on a judicial whim
simply by manipulating the required state of mind. The statute's amorphous language,
"subjects" or "causes [a person] to be subjected," would reasonably support whatever
state-of-mind standard courts desire. Charles F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitution-
al Torts, 77 GEo. LJ. 1441, 1458 (1989). Second, due process claims can be passed off
as generic tort actions and remanded to state court if plaintiffs fail to allege that the
defendant official possessed the requisite state of mind. Nahmod, supra note 24, at 1743.
77. See infra subsection I(D)(1).
78. See infra subsection I(D)(2).
79. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1317 (1992), which provides,
Every teacher, vice principal and principal in the public schools shall have the
right to exercise the same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils
attending his school, during the time they are in attendance, including the time
required in going to and from their homes, as the parents, guardians or persons
in parental relation to such pupils may exercise over them.
80. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 146 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993).
81. Id. In Doe, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that a special
relationship between the state and a child arises in various circumstances: when a child is
confined to a state mental health facility; when a social services agency removes the child
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A school's legal authority to confine children also derives
from the state's compulsory education statutes.82 These statutes
command students to attend schools until they reach a certain
statutory age. Consequently, they are left without the option to
decline attendance, and both children and their parents may be
penalized for a child's truancy.' Courts, however, have generally
found compulsory school attendance laws insufficient as a basis for
imposing affirmative duties on schools. The argument in favor of
such a duty is that the state's truancy laws impose a restraint on
schoolchildren's liberty, thereby creating a custodial relationship
and a corresponding duty of care. Courts, however, are quick to
distinguish the plight of prisoners and mental patients from that of
schoolchildren. Unlike either protected group, the courts respond,
students do not depend on the state to provide for their basic
human needs, nor do they suffer the same degree of deprivation
of their liberty.'
from her natural home and places her under state supervision; or when the child has
been placed in foster care. "In these instances, the state has, to varying degrees, assumed
an obligation to protect the child, in much the same way that a capable parent would."
Id.
82. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327. It should also be noted that school
officials owe a broad common law duty to students to protect them from tortious or
criminal conduct of teachers. A state law duty is not equivalent, however, to a consti-
tutional duty. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216-19 (7th Cir. 1988).
83. See, eg., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1333 (imposing fine and/or jail sentence on
parents and guardians who violate compulsory education law).
84. Two rare instances in which the compulsory school attendance argument were
found to be persuasive were Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641
(E.D.N.Y 1989), and Robert G. v. Newburgh City Sch. Dist., No. 89 CIV. 2978 (RPP),
1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990). In Pagano, a sixth-grader who had been subjected
to seventeen physical and verbal attacks by other students brought a § 1983 action
against school officials for failing to prevent this continued abuse. The district court ruled
that students required to attend school were owed some duty of care by school authori-
ties. Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643. Although not formally grounding its decision on state
custody, the Pagano court compared the plaintiffs situation to that of a foster child, a
situation in which the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly decided that there is a duty
of protection. Id. at 643 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989)). The court also pointed to the school's role as parens patriae (par-
ent of the country) in relation to the victim and his aggressors as a further justification
for imposing a duty to care. Id.
Robert G. applied Stoneking Fs functional custody analysis, see infra note 99, in
imposing an affirmative duty of protection on the school. In that case, a student had
been sexually assaulted by a substitute teacher whom the state knew to have a past
criminal history of such sexual misconduct. According to both Stoneking I and Robert G.,
students were deemed to be wards of the school during the time they were required to
be present by the state's compulsory school attendance laws. Robert G., 1990 WL 3210,
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In D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, s
for example, two female students sued various school officials after
being repeatedly sexually molested by male classmates over a six-
month period. The plaintiffs asserted that the combined effect of
compulsory school attendance and the school's in loco parentis
authority so restrained their liberty as to leave them in the
school's custody. This deprivation of their liberty, they argued,
created an affirmative duty of state protection similar to the one
owed to prisoners and mental patients.86 In refusing to impose an
affirmative duty on the school, the court stated that students did
not face the same restraints on their liberty as other protected
groups and did not depend on the state as their primary
caretaker.87 "Institutionalized persons," the court said, are not
"given the opportunity to seek outside help to meet their basic
needs [and are o]bviously ... not free to leave."'  The court felt
that students, on the other hand, voluntarily chose to attend
schools, could rely on their parents for assistance, and were capa-
ble of leaving the school if they so desired.89 It reasoned that
[h]ere it is the parents who decide whether that education will
take place in the home, in public or private schools .... For
some, the options may be limited for financial reasons. However,
even when enrolled in public school parents retain the discretion
to remove the child from classes as they see fit, subject only to
truancy penalties for continued periods of unexcused ab-
sence .... Moreover .... "it [cannot] be denied that a parent isjustified in withdrawing his child from a school where the health
and welfare of the child is threatened."'
at *1 (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated
sub nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989).
More typical of the judicial response to compulsory school attendance laws is Rus-
sell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1992), affd, 981 F.2d 1263
(11th Cir. 1992). In that case, the court held that a compulsory school attendance law
did not impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect a student from physical at-
tacks by another student. The court distinguished Pagano on the grounds that in that
case, the school was aware of the repeated incidents of abuse and promised to correct
the problem. Id. at 1583.
85. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
86. Id. at 1370.
87. Id. at 1371.
88. Id.
89. It should be noted, however, that the Pennsylvania School Board Association
conceded that the school would not have allowed the child's mother to attend school to
watch over the classroom or provide assistance. Id. at 1381.
90. Id. at 1371 (citations omitted) (quoting Zebra v. School Dist., 296 A.2d 748, 751
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The court concluded that the statutory grant of in loco parentis
status to schools did not alter the reality that parents remain the
primary caretakers for their children. Although state law invested
public school teachers with authority to control and reasonably
discipline students, it did not impose on them a duty to do so."
What this argument fails to consider is the perceptions of
students and their parents that children are bound to attend public
school and comply with the directives of school personnel.' The
Second Restatement of Torts states that "custody is complete if the
person against whom and in whose presence the authority is as-
serted believes it to be valid, or is in doubt as to its validity, and
submits to it."'93 Under this standard, it becomes clear that if par-
ents and students believe the school's legal authority to be com-
plete, custody does in fact exist.
Most parents feel that they have little choice but to send their
children to public school and that they will be held legally ac-
countable if they do not. Although parents do have the right to
choose how their child is educated,94 the exercise of this right is
subject to heavy economic constraint: private schools and home
education are simply not viable alternatives for the vast majority
of families.95 For all practical purposes, the will of a parent must
yield to that of the state in deciding a child's educational fate. As
for students, they are taught, if not forced, to accept the authority
(Pa. 1972)). Despite the court's assertion that students are presented with various edu-
cational options, most students do not enjoy this choice. As the dissent correctly pointed
out, "[flor the vast majority of children of school age, this is no choice at all. Their
families are not in a financial position to fund a private school education. Even fewer
are in the rare position of being able to provide their children an adequate education at
home." Id. at 1380 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at 1371.
92. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). In Lee, a high school student and
her father brought suit to enjoin the recitation of a prayer at her graduation ceremony.
In prohibiting the prayer, the Court acknowledged the pressures to submit to the school's
authority that schoolchildren experience regardless of their personal objections: "[T]he
dissenter of high school age .. .has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by
the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow." Id. at 2658.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 41(2) (1989).
94. The Supreme Court recognized the right to direct the education of one's children
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court determined that the
"right of parents to engage [a teacher] ... to instruct their children . .. [is] within the
liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment." Ld. at 400.
95. See Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1380 n.4 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) ("Only 12
percent of the school-age population is enrolled in private schools.").
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of their teachers. Nowhere was this more evident than in Middle
Bucks. To avoid the daily abuse waiting for her in the classroom
lavatory, the plaintiff repeatedly asked to use a different school
bathroom. The teacher allegedly either ignored or refused her
request, forcing her to use the unisex bathroom and subjecting her
to the continual molestations of her male classmates. This series of
events illustrates that students believe a school's legal authority to
be valid, which in turn explains their resulting willingness to sub-
mit to it. The legal reality then of the statutory authority vested in
schools is the creation of a complete and effective custodial envi-
ronment.96
A duty of protection also might have arisen in Middle Bucks
because the conditions of confinement arguably exceeded those
permitted under the law. In DeShaney, the Supreme Court de-
clared that "[o]f course, the protections of the Due Process Clause,
both substantive and procedural, may be triggered when the State,
by the affirmative acts of its agents, subjects an involuntarily con-
fined individual to deprivations of liberty which are not among
those generally authorized by his confinement." 97 In Middle
Bucks, Pennsylvania law permitted school boards to set reasonable
regulations to govern students' conduct and vested in school offi-
cials "only such control as is reasonably necessary to prevent in-
fractions of discipline and interference with the educational pro-
cess."98 This scope of authority clearly does not encompass the
confinement of the female plaintiffs to situations in which they
were forced to use lavatories with members of the opposite sex.
Nor does it extend to the teacher's refusal of the plaintiff's request
to use another bathroom to avoid continued sexual abuse. The
96. The willingness of some students to submit to school authority is also demon-
strated by their taking part in school prayer or reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, even if
doing so may be contrary to their or their families' wishes. Students experience subtle
psychological pressures to participate in these rituals, pressures that go beyond direct
coercion in the classic sense. Both school prayer and salutation of the flag occur "within
a framework in which legal coercion to attend school (i.e., coercion under threat of pen-
alty) provides the ultimate backdrop." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2684 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (barring compulsory
school prayer); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (bar-
ring compulsory flag salute).
97. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 n.8
(1989).




school thus subjected the plaintiffs to confining quarters beyond
what the statute contemplated, for which it should bear respon-
sibility.
2. The Functional Custody Perspective. A functional custody
perspective looks beyond the issue of authority in determining
whether a set of circumstances constitutes custody for purposes of
establishing an affirmative duty. Instead, the issues of control,
dependency, and vulnerability are the focus. Schools may be said
to have functional custody of students because they restrict
students' ability to protect themselves as well as their parents'
ability to intercede on their behalf.9
Part of Middle Bucks's justification for denying the plaintiffs
protection was that they were less dependent on the state for as-
sistance than other groups. In elucidating this point, the court rea-
soned,
The state's duty to prisoners and involuntarily committed patients
exists because of the full time severe and continuous state restric-
tion of liberty in both environments. Institutionalized persons are
wholly dependant [sic] upon the state for food, shelter, clothing
and safety. It is not within their power to provide for themselves,
nor are they given the opportunity to seek outside help to meet
their basic needs.1"
The court felt that students, on the other hand, were not subject
to continuous custody, remained in the primary care of their par-
ents, and did not depend on the state to fulfill their basic needs.
Because the students were free to "leave the school building ev-
99. The notion of "functional custody" in schools was first introduced in Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch. Dist. (Stoneking 1), 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988). It was devel-
oped more extensively in Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public
Schools After DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1940, 1966-76 (1990), which this Note relies
on as a basis for its "functional custody" discussion. The circumstances involved in Mid-
dle Bucks are particularly illustrative of the factors that together create situations of func-
tional custody in schools.
100. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371. One commentator has suggested that even mem-
bers of the general public experience a "condition of dependence." This view asserts that
the government has created a condition of individual dependency on its services and
resources over time. It owns a monopoly over law enforcement, controls access to certain
resources and information, and encourages reliance on its own regulatory structure in
certain areas. As gradual dependence strips people of self-help remedies, the opportunity
for abuse becomes greater because harm may be perpetuated on a systematic basis. See
Bandes, supra note 61, at 2294-97.
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eryday .... after school hours," the state "thus did not deny
[them] meaningful access to sources of help."'0 1 As a result, the
court concluded that the school environment did not fall within
the Estelle-Youngberg custodial exception recognized in De-
Shaney.'"
To understand the rationale behind the "deprivation of liber-
ty" test is to understand the injustice perpetrated in Middle Bucks.
In recognizing the state's obligation to protect prisoners, the U.S.
Supreme Court reasoned that "because the prisoner is unable 'by
reason of the deprivation of his liberty [to] dare for himself,' it is
only 'just' that the State be required to care for him."' 3 The
Court later extended this protection to mental patients reasoning
that "[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted
criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional [under
the Due Process Clause] to confine the involuntarily commit-
ted-who may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions."'0 4
Through its compulsory attendance law, Middle Bucks School simi-
larly confined the two female plaintiffs to dangerous quarters,
rendering them defenseless against the sexual abuse awaiting them.
A logical extension of the Supreme Court's reasoning dictates that
the school had a duty to provide a safe educational environment
for these innocent and otherwise unprotected children. By refusing
to recognize this duty, the Middle Bucks court denied the plaintiffs
the protection that the Constitution afforded them, in blatant
disregard of the "deprivation of liberty" standard delineated in
DeShaney.0 5
Moreover, the notion that schoolchildren are somehow differ-
ent from other protected classes is not a persuasive justification for
the disparate treatment that they receive. It is simply untrue that
students face any less of a deprivation of their liberty than prison-
101. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372.
102. Id.
103. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
104. Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982)) (alteration in
original).
105. Nowhere in DeShaney does the Court limit the finding of a duty of protection
only to situations of involuntary, round-the-clock, legal custody. The Third Circuit had
previously read DeShaney as acknowledging that similar state-imposed restraints on per-
sonal liberty, in addition to imprisonment and institutionalization, would trigger a duty to
prevent harm. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1379 (Sloviter, CJ. dissenting) (citing Horton v.
Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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ers or mental patients. The mere fact that they are free to leave
the confines of the school at the conclusion of the school day does
not make them any less of a prisoner to the school's policies dur-
ing the time that they are there.'6 Nor does it render them any
less vulnerable to attacks from other students with whom they are
confined. In short, the court's attempt to rationalize a denial of
protection to students fails to acknowledge a true understanding of
the nature of confinement and the important liberty interests that
it burdens.
The court of appeals' insistence that schoolchildren care for
themselves or solicit the aid of their parents shows a lack of un-
derstanding of the degree of dependency. In asserting that school-
children should practice self-reliance, the three-judge panel that
first decided Middle Bucks declared that "[t]o the extent that the
child is able to take care of himself or herself, attending school
does not effectively preempt that responsibility. ' ' "W The court
thereby confused the responsibility to care for oneself with the ca-
pacity to care for oneself."c~
In Middle Bucks, one of the victims, L.H., exercised both
remarkable responsibility and courage by allegedly bringing her
complaints to the attention of a school administrator. Her contin-
ued exposure to sexual abuse indicates that she simply lacked the
capacity to protect herself. As for the plaintiff, D.R., she qualified
as an "exceptional student" because she suffered from a hearing
impairment and had difficulty communicating. Her disabilities un-
doubtedly interfered with her ability to seek outside help."° If
106. But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) ("Though attendance may
not always be voluntary, the public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps
when very young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school
hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home.").
107. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., Nos. 41-1136, 91-1137,
1991 WL 276292, at *6, (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), affd on reh'g, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir.
1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
108. The dissent in Middle Bucks pointed out that elementary school children have
not yet gained sufficient independence of school authorities to complain in prompt fash-
ion about constitutional deprivations they encounter at school. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at
1381 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting). This inadequate capacity may pertain to older children in
similar situations as well. In fact, it is common knowledge that even adult women who
have been sexually assaulted are reluctant to come forward given the private issues in-
volved. Id.
109. D.R. had already been removed from a regular public school before coming to
Middle Bucks School. She alleged that she was unable to disclose the assaults because of
her disability and her fear that if she complained about the brutality, she would be re-
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anything, her status as an exceptional student only increased her
dependence on the state for. assistance and should have alerted the
school to her greater need for protection. Confined to the graphic
arts classroom, the plaintiffs were unable to halt the sexual abuse
they encountered from their male classmates. Denying this reality,
the Middle Bucks ruling can be explained only by the court's
failure to perceive the disabling effect of compulsory education on
the plaintiffs' ability to care for themselves.
Under DeShaney, an affirmative protective duty also may be
based on the school's role in exposing its students to danger.11
In explaining its refusal to find an affirmative duty of protection,
the DeShaney Court remarked that "[w]hile the State may have
been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it
played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render
him more vulnerable to them."'' The DeShaney Court thus inti-
mated that despite its refusal to come to Joshua's aid, the state
played no part in creating the domestic environment in which the
harm took place. Post-DeShaney courts have adopted this state-
created danger theory, focusing their inquiry on whether the state
has affirmatively acted to create the danger to the victim or in-
crease his vulnerability to it."2
In contrast to the domestic abuse scenario presented in
DeShaney, school abuse occurs in an environment that the state
moved from the class and would have nowhere else to go to school. Id.
110. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., No. 89-C-20258, 1990 WL 304250
(N.D. Ill. May 17, 1990). In Stauffer, the court recognized a special relationship that gave
rise to a protective duty when the state placed a student in a dangerous situation. In
that case, a mentally handicapped student was molested by another student in a bath-
room during a school field trip to a local mall. The victim alleged that the teacher knew
or should have known that the other student had made threats against him in the past
and had previously been arrested for criminal sexual misconduct. lM. at *1. The court
began its analysis by holding that the state's compulsory school attendance law did not
create a general deprivation of liberty comparable to that imposed on prisoners or men-
tal patients. It reasoned that "[i]f this were the case then every time a school child is
assaulted by the class bully during recess there would be a tort of constitutional dimen-
sions under § 1983." Id. at *5.
Despite holding that no general duty existed, the Stauffer court did hold that state
actors have a duty to protect a person from the violence of others if the state places
that person in a position of danger. It concluded that by allowing the child to use the
bathroom with another student who was known to be dangerous, the teacher placed the
child in a hazardous situation for which the school was liable. Id. at *6.
111. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
112. See, e.g., Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1990).
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both creates and regulates."3 The state in Middle Bucks, for ex-
ample, initially exposed the victims to undue risk by creating a
dangerous classroom environment. The school designed the physi-
cal layout of the classroom, which contained both a darkroom and
a single bathroom. Although not inherently dangerous, the class-
room soon became dangerous as a result of inadequate supervi-
sion. The school placed an inexperienced teacher in charge, who
failed to deal properly with male students' repeated misbehavior.
The teacher herself was subjected to "open lewdness" by one male
student, was allegedly present when plaintiff D.R. was forcibly
dragged into the bathroom, and was aware on at least one occa-
sion that students of both sexes were in the bathroom together.
Her general reaction was simply to ignore the behavior, walk
away, or dismiss it as "those boys and their raging hormones."'' 4
Having thus created an environment that allowed sexual vio-
lence to flourish, the school invited further deviance through vari-
ous displays of neglect. The teacher refused to allow D.R. to use a
bathroom elsewhere in the school, rendering her that much more
vulnerable to unending sexual assaults." 5 Other school officials
who allegedly also knew about the misconduct in the graphic arts
classroom refused to remedy the situation. Plaintiff L.H. claimed
that she reported an attempted sexual attack to the school's assis-
tant director, but her plea for help fell on deaf ears."6 This
apparently widespread and demonstrated indifference by school
pers6nnel heightened the victims' vulnerability to the recurring,
nightmarish sexual episodes.
Framing the analysis as one of state-created danger demands
revisiting the state action doctrine. In cases of peer abuse, courts
often limit their focus to the period in which the sexual abuse
took place, rather than examining the entire relationship between
a school and its students. By doing so, they may conclude that a
due process violation is lacking since the school did not act to
cause the abuse during that time. This narrow inquiry, however,
denies the reality that the school's actions prior to that time con-
tributed substantially to the resulting sexual molestation. Requiring
113. Huefner, supra note 99, at 1968.
114. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1378 (3d Cir.
1992) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
115. Id. at 1380.
116. Id. at 1366.
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the two female students to attend the school, forcing them to
share bathroom facilities with male classmates, and placing a stu-
dent-teacher in charge of a particularly unruly class all constituted
actions by the state that seriously jeopardized the plaintiffs' bodily
integrity. It was only after this active intervention in the plaintiffs'
lives that the state decided to pursue a policy of inaction and apa-
thy towards the sexual abuse that allegedly had come to its atten-
tion. That policy of inaction cannot protect the state from liability.
As Judge Posner declared in Bowers v. DeVito,
If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private
persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say
that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor
as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.117
It follows that Middle Bucks School could not first usher students
through its gates and later seek to disclaim any responsibility for
the harm that befell them behind closed doors."
II. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
A. School Board Liability
Under section 1983, a plaintiff can seek money damages for
peer abuse from either an individual school employee or the
school board. Because school boards have comparatively greater
resources, plaintiffs will likely attempt to pursue claims against
school boards. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,"9 the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized municipal liability and held that
municipalities, including school boards, could be considered "per-
sons" within the meaning of section 1983.20 Municipalities, more-
117. 686 F.2d 616, 618 (1982).
118. As Justice Brennan stated in DeShaney,
[Tihe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to pre-
vent government "from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression." My disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see that
inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can
result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it. Today's opinion
construes the Due Process Clause to permit a State to displace private sources
of protection and then, at the critical moment, to shrug its shoulders and turn
away from the harm that it has promised to try to prevent.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 211-12 (1989)
(Brenann, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 196 (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
348 (1986) (alteration in original))).
119. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
120. Id. at 690. The Court thus overruled its earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365
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over, have not been accorded qualified immunity for their constitu-
tional violations, even when such violations are committed in good
faith.'
Recognition of an affirmative duty of protection,"z however,
does not automatically translate into recovery for victims of peer
abuse. Rather, in order to prevail against a school board under
section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the enforcement of a
school board's policy or custom'n was the "moving force" be-
hind the violation of a student's substantive due process rights."
U.S. 167 (1961), to the extent that Monroe had held that municipalities were immune
from § 1983 suits. See id. at 187.
121. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1979). Although also sub-
ject to liability, an individual school administrator enjoys qualified immunity "under the
statute as long as he conducts himself in good faith." Id. at 657. If, however, an
employee's conduct "violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known," the administrator may then be held per-
sonally liable. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In granting qualified immu-
nity to individual officials while denying it to school boards, courts have recognized the
increasing importance of equitable loss spreading for questions of government responsibili-
ty. The costs of official misconduct in § 1983 cases must be distributed among three
different parties: "[T]he victim -of the constitutional deprivation; the officer whose conduct
caused the injury; and the public, as represented by the municipal entity." Owen, 445
U.S. at 657.
122. For a discussion of the affirmative duty of protection, see supra Section I(D).
123. A string of decisions, replete with widely divergent interpretations of the "official
policy" standard, has followed MonelL In attempting to define further "what the full
contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may be," Monell, 436 U.S. at 695, post-
Monell courts have been largely unsuccessful in determining which types of misconduct
fall under the statute's umbrella. See, eg., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
127 (1988) (attributing supervisor's adverse personnel decisions to the city when such
decisions were considered "final" and not reviewed by higher-ranking officials); Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (finding that a single decision by an offi-
cial with policymaking authority'in a certain area may constitute official policy and be
attributable to the government entity); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
823-24 (1985) (noting that a single incident of police misconduct, by itself, does not con-
stitute a policy of inadequate training for the purpose of municipal liability).
124. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
694). Because municipalities bear § 1983 liability only for their policies and customs, it
becomes necessary to identify exactly who makes municipal policy. Normally, a municipal
entity formulates policy through its lawmaking body. For example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held a school district responsible for the decisions of its
board of trustees because the district could only act through its board. Stoddard v.
School Dist. No. 1, 590 F.2d 829, 835 (10th Cir. 1979). If certain school officials can be
considered "policymakers," then liability may be attributed to the school board for the
failure of those individuals to deal hdequately with student safety.
Identifying which school officials occupy policymaking positions can be a thorny
endeavor. By definition, however, the number of people potentially implicated is limited
to those officials possessing the necessary policymaking authority. This circle of liability
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It is highly improbable, however, that a school board would adopt
a formal "policy" of inaction towards school safety. Recognizing
that not all culpable conduct flows from formal policy, Monell
declared that section 1983 municipal liability may be based on a
"governmental 'custom' even though such custom has not received
formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking chan-
nels."'" Thus, a school board's indifferent attitude towards safety
may reflect a practice that is so widespread and permanent that it
represents a de facto policy.126 Such a policy will be attributed to
the school when "the duration and frequency" of the abuse "war-
rants a finding of either actual or constructive knowledge" by the
school board or policymakers charged with the supervision of
has been further restricted to include only those officials who possess "final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.
There is little problem, of course, if a particular school official has been expressly dele-
gated policymaking authority. The difficulty arises when an official's action or inaction
seems to reflect school board policy without any express delegation.
One commentator has argued persuasively that the official policy formulation ig-
nores the basic realities of bureaucratic decisionmaking and is therefore unworkable. See
Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law
and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. LJ. 1753, 1772-79 (1989). On a general level, the
doctrine reflects a misapprehension of the "nature of policy" and the "locus of
policymaking." ld. at 1777. This unduly restrictive conception of policymaking is especially
true in the case of "street-level" bureaucracies, like schools and police departments, in
which low-level employees interact with the public "on the street." Id. at 1778. In
schools, the daily demands of school life often require teachers and school administrators
to make decisions of tremendous consequence. Thus, a decision made by personnel out-
side the formal locus of policymaking can itself constitute policy or custom, a reality that
the official policy standard fails to recognize. See id. The shaping or creation of a policy
or custom in this informal manner raises questions regarding the viability of the official
policy or custom requirement. Its failure to capture the true nature of organizational
decisionmaking perpetrates a twin evil: it denies governmental accountability for its ac-
tions and refuses federal relief to which plaintiffs with bona fide claims are entitled. See
id. at 1778-79.
125. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. To limit the use of custom-based liability, lower
courts have generally required more than an isolated incident of wrongdoing. Instead, the
existence of a pattern or series of wrongful acts is necessary to establish a custom that
fairly represents official policy. Schuck, supra note 124, at 1761 n. 40.
126. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 76
(1986); cf. DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F. Supp. 610 (D.N.J. 1990). In DiLoreto,
a police officer's visual observation of a detainee urinating, in the absence of suspicious
circumstances, was found to violate the detainee's civil rights. The court found that the
borough's failure to promulgate a formal policy on the accompanying of detainees to the
bathroom did not absolve it of liability. The court reasoned that "[h]aving no policy is
itself a policy, and in this case, it is an unconstitutional policy. By not creating and im-
plementing a policy and not training its employees regarding accompanying detainees to
the bathroom, the Borough has expressed deliberate indifference to the fourth amend-
ment rights of detainees ...." Id. at 624.
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schoolchildren. 27 Precedent indicates that acts of omission, as
well as acts of commission, may support a finding of policy or cus-
tom.,,
When a plaintiff seeks to show a school board's custom
through omission, the inaction of the school board must amount to
deliberate indifference towards due process rights before liability
will be permitted under section 1983.129 The U.S. Supreme Court
recently elucidated this principle in City of Canton v. Harris."o
In Canton, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 due process claim
against the city after the police department failed to provide her
with necessary medical assistance after her arrest.131 The Court
ruled that a municipality could be held liable for inadequate police
training only when "the failure to train amount[ed] to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come
into contact.' 132  Such a rule comported with the Court's pro-
nouncement in Monell that municipal policy must be the "moving
force" behind the constitutional violation under section 1983."
The Court concluded that "[o]nly where a municipality's failure to
train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate
indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming
be properly thought of as a city 'policy or custom' that is action-
able under [section] 198 3 ." "4
127. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 187), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1027 (1988). For those plaintiffs unable to establish official policy or custom and there-
fore ineligible for municipal relief, the option of proceeding against the individual officials
directly responsible is another avenue open to them. Whether individual liability is a
viable alternative, however, is questionable in light of the extensive immunities officials
enjoy and their limited resources. See Schuck, supra note 124, at 1755 n.11.
128. See Karen M. Blum, Monell, DeShaney, and Zinermon: Official Policy, Affirma-
tive Duty, Established State Procedure and Local Government Liability Under Section
1983, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1990); see also Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891
F.2d 1241, 1247 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff had established a "policy...
of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of paraplegic and physically incapacitated
prisoners"), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Cabales v. County of Los Angeles, 864
F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the county's failure to provide adequate
medical care to inmates demonstrated an unconstitutional policy or custom of deliberate
indifference to inmates' medical and psychological needs), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087, reinstat-
ed, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989).
129. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
130. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
131. Id. at 381.
132. Id. at 388.
133. Id. at 388-89 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
134. Id. at 389. In assessing these requirements, consideration should be given to how
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In practice, proving that a school board's deliberate indiffer-
ence amounts to a custom or policy is a difficult hurdle for plain-
tiffs to overcome. 35 This difficulty may be the result of the in-
creasing wariness on the part of courts, since Monroe was decided,
to open up the section 1983 floodgates to any and all claims.36
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "does not transform
every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional viola-
tion.' 37 The fear that an expansive reading of the Due Process
Clause would relegate section 1983's status to that of a mere tort
statute has contributed to courts' restrictive approach to due pro-
cess claimsY.8 The reluctance to grant federal relief is especially
well they effect the legislative purpose of the statute. The primary aim of § 1983 was to
provide protection to those injured by the "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Congress thus created an express federal remedy to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment against abusive practices by those carrying a badge of state
authority. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1979). In keeping with
this purpose, school boards were denied qualified immunity for official transgressions. See
supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. Said the Court,
How "uniquely amiss" it would be . . . if the government itself-"the
social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty, jus-
tice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for
social conduct"-were permitted to disavow liability for the injury it has begot-
ten.
Owen, 445 U.S. at 651 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970)).
135. See, eg., Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding
that school superintendent was not deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse claim when su-
perintendent contacted parents, launched an investigation into the allegations, and took
immediate action against those responsible). But see C.M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist.,
828 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding that school officials' response to reports of
teacher's conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to student's constitutional rights).
136. Cf Sessions v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 501 F. Supp. 251 (M.D. La. 1980)
(dismissing First and Fourteenth Amendment claims that handicapped children had been
deprived of meaningful, free, and appropriate public education, brought under § 1983,
because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
137. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)
(citing cases). The DeShaney court went on to say that "[a] State may, through its courts
and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties . . . as it wishes. But not 'all common
law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335 (1986)).
138. Lower federal courts also have employed procedural mechanisms to insulate mu-
nicipalities from § 1983 actions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for
example, adopted a "heightened pleading standard" that required § 1983 complaints
against municipal corporations to state the basis of the claim with factual detail and par-
ticularity. Part of the justification for the rule is one of efficiency; a more relaxed plead-
ing standard would subject municipalities to costly and time-consuming discovery in every
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strong in those cases in which state remedies are considered ade-
quate. 39
Section 1983's requirements for municipal liability are aimed
at ensuring that the municipality caused the constitutional depri-
vation. Causation questions often become complicated because
some causal link between the municipality and the injury is pres-
ent in most cases."4 Thus, an inquiry premised on finding the
absolute cause of an injury is an exercise in futility.141 What must
be ascertained instead is the substantiality of the nexus between
the state and the injured party. 42 It is only this latter inquiry
that truly addresses the issue of government responsibility. 43
Standards that demand proof of an explicit policy or high
level of culpability on the school's part exemplify the judicial ide-
ology that a close causal nexus must necessarily be established
before fault will be ascribed to the government. The Supreme
Court has concluded that the government may not be held liable
under section 1983 merely because it employs a tortfeasor."44 In
rejecting the notion of government liability predicated on respon-
§ 1983 case. The court felt that this burden would undermine municipal protections from
suit and hamper municipal functions. See, eg., Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir.
1985).
In a recent decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated "heightened
pleading requirements" in § 1983 cases alleging municipal liability. See Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). The
Court found that the asserted justification wrongly equated "freedom from liability with
immunity from suit." Id. at 1162. Reaffirming its position in Monell, the Court reasoned
that although a municipality is not subject to § 1983 liability on a respondeat superior
basis, this protection "does not encompass immunity from suit." Id.
139. For example, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), § 1983 relief was denied to
a plaintiff who claimed that law enforcement officers had damaged his reputation by
publicly branding him an active shoplifter. The Court placed the plaintiff's reputation
interest among the many that states could adequately protect through tort law, which
provided "a forum for vindication of those interests by means of damages actions." Id. at
712.
140. Schuck, supra note 124, at 1764-65.
141. As has been noted,
[O]nce events are set in motion, there is, in terms of causation alone, no place
to stop. The event without millions of causes is simply inconceivable; and the
mere fact of causation, as distinguished from the nature and degree of the
causal connection, can provide no clue of any kind to singling out those which
are to be held legally responsible.
W. PAGE KEETON El AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 266
(5th ed. 1984).
142. Schuck, supra note 124, at 1765.
143. Id.
144. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978).
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deat superior, the Court has reasoned that it is simply incompati-
ble with the causal language of the statute.145
B. Implications of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
Requiring deliberate indifference of school boards to establish
a due process violation encourages the boards to bureaucratically
remove themselves from daily school affairs. In Thelma D. v.
Board of Education,46 elementary school students who were sex-
ually abused by a teacher brought suit against the school board
under section 1983. Despite five previous complaints of sexual
abuse lodged against the teacher over a sixteen-year period, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the school
board could not be held liable. 47 Among the reasons the court
gave for its decision was a conclusion that the board did not dem-
onstrate deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the sexual
misconduct."4 The school's administrative procedures designed to
address child abuse apparently allowed only a limited amount of
information to reach the school board. 49 In dicta, the court com-
mented that "[w]ithout notice of the prior incidents, the Board...
cannot be said to have shown deliberate indifference towards [the
teacher's sexual] misconduct."'50 Under such a scheme, a school
board avoids punishment simply by maintaining a general policy of
ignorance towards the misconduct taking place on its doorstep.
The Thelma D. court openly recognized the incompatibility of
societal goals with the disincentives for agency involvement the
statute provided. In identifying this troubling "conflict of interests,"
the court reasoned,
In order to more effectively protect the constitutional rights of its
students, the Board must possess a greater knowledge and aware-
ness of incidents involving misconduct by its employees. This
greater knowledge ... [h]owever... also subjects the Board to
liability for displaying deliberate indifference should it fail to
sufficiently remedy the problem.
145. Id.
146. 934 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1991).
147. Id. at 931-33.
148. Id. at 934.
149. Id. at 935.
150. Id. at 934.
151. Id. at 935.
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"The magnitude of the tragedy"'52 in Thelma D. also moved the
court to sound a warning to school boards and other public agen-
cies.
In the future, this court will closely scrutinize bureaucratic hierar-
chies which, in their operation, tend to insulate its policymaking
officials from knowledge of events which may subject them to
[section] 1983 liability. This case ... compels us to provide clear
warning to the Board that in the future a defense of no liability
due to lack of knowledge may no longer apply to a bureaucracy
which continues to block notice to the Board of allegations of
sexual abuse of students committed by teachers and others during
school related activities. 53
Equally disturbing is the consistent willingness of federal
courts to categorize school behavior as negligent, and therefore not
a basis for liability, when it truly warrants a finding of reckless
indifference. In Middle Bucks,'" for example, one of the plain-
tiffs allegedly told the school's assistant director that another stu-
dent was trying to force her into the bathroom for sexual purpos-
es. The Third Circuit's characterization of the school's conduct is
typical of the sympathetic yet dismissive reaction of many courts.
We readily acknowledge the apparent indefensible passivity of at
least some school defendants under the circumstances. Accepting
the allegations as true, viz., that one school defendant was ad-
vised of the misconduct and apparently did not investigate, they
show nonfeasance but they do not rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation.155
One wonders what degree of indifference would have amounted to
misfeasance in the court's estimation. Indeed, would anything short
of the school's actual participation in the incident have been con-
sidered constitutionally offensive?5 6
152. Id. at 936.
153. Id.
154. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir.
1992) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
155. Id. at 1376.
156. School liability cases brought as state tort actions have been dispensed with in a
similar manner. In Booker v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 394 N.E.2d 452 (ill. App. Ct. 1979),
for example, a ten-year-old girl brought suit against the school board and her teacher
after she was physically assaulted by a group of her classmates in a bathroom. The
teacher had assigned as the bathroom monitor the student whom the plaintiff had pre-
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The decision of a recent prison case sheds some light on what
circumstances of peer abuse conform to section 1983's require-
ment. In Redman v. County of San Diego,157 a pretrial detainee
sued the county and county jail personnel under section 1983 after
being confined to a holding cell with a homosexual who later
raped him. The offending inmate was twenty-seven years old,
stood approximately 5'11" tall, and weighed 165 pounds. Prison of-
ficials knew that he was aggressive and had a reputation for coerc-
ing and manipulating other inmates for sexual favors. The plaintiff,
by comparison, was then eighteen years old, stood 5'6" tall, and
weighed approximately 130 pounds. On his arrival at the detention
facility, he was originally placed in a receiving area designated as
the "young and tender" unit but later was transferred in with the
general jail population, where the rape took place.'-"
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first found
that the plaintiff's right to personal security had been violated by
the deliberate indifference of prison officials.'59 It observed that
"if... officials know or should know of [a] particular vulnerabil-
ity, then the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on them an obliga-
tion not to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability."'"
viously identified as the leader of a group of classmates who had threatened her. Id. at
453. The Illinois appellate court held that the complaint had failed to establish that the
teacher's actions constituted willful and wanton conduct for which a defense of immunity
would not apply, finding that there was no evidence suggesting that the teacher had
intentionally breached her duty to supervise the plaintiff. Id. at 455. It also concluded
that the teacher had no knowledge that the plaintiff faced an impending danger from
entering the bathroom unaccompanied. Id. Finally, the court noted that although the
teacher may have been negligent in naming the "gang" leader as monitor, such action
did not amount to willful and wanton conduct. Id. Noteworthy is the dissenting judge's
admonishment that "[u]nless the Board protects its students against known extortionists,
our public schools are in danger of deteriorating into a jungle." Id. at 455-56 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
157. 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 972 (1992).
158. Id. at 1437-38.
159. See also Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 362 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[P]laintiff has also
presented sufficient, uncontested evidence to raise a genuine question of fact as to wheth-
er . . . prison officials were deliberately indifferent to inmate's repeated physical attacks
on [him].") (citation omitted); cf. Rogers v. State of Ala. Dep't of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation, 825 F. Supp. 986, 992 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (finding genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether supervisors knew or should have known that their
subordinates were inadequately monitoring mental patients, one of whom was raped by
another patient, and whether by failing to remedy this inadequate security, they acted
with deliberate indifference to patient's constitutional right to adequate security).
160. Redman, 942 F.2d at 1443 (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d
663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989)).
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The court based its finding that officials knew of the plaintiff's
vulnerability on his original placement in the "young and tender"
unit. The court also found evidence that the plaintiff's right to
personal security may have been infringed as a result of the
county's policy or custom of overcrowding the prison, such that
heterosexual inmates were confined with aggressive homosexu-
als.161
In light of the harms befalling students today, many schools
are more of a close cousin to detention facilities than a distant
relative. For example, nearly 1000 students a year must be re-
entered in one Sacramento school district after completing terms
in juvenile detention centers. 162 it seems reasonable to ask just
how different these conditions are from those presented in
Redman-a forced integration of known offenders with the young
and defenseless. Limited resources may leave school planners with
little alternative. This financial reality, however, does not deny the
existence of the school's policy, it only explains it.
The sheer volume of the problem is understandably over-
whelming to teachers and school boards. Policing a seemingly
endless supply of youthful deviants may tax even the most resilient
of educators. How else may we reconcile the apathy of the Middle
Bucks School personnel with the repeated sexual molestations that
they witnessed? The constitutional mandate discussed in Redman,
however, knows no such excuses. Schools boards today cannot
help but be aware of their students' vulnerability, and the Due
Process Clause therefore requires that they not remain recklessly
indifferent towards it.
III. CONCLUSION
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School exem-
plifies the injustice that results from a restrictive view of due pro-
cess guarantees. By exculpating the school board for its supposed
inaction, the court allowed the school to act with impunity in
setting its policies and rewarded its callous indifference to the
sexual misconduct taking place on its doorstep. The message con-
veyed to the victims and their parents was that the school was a
place not to be reared, but rather to be feared. Long heralded as
161. Id. at 1444.
162. McGrath, supra note 8, at A2.
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a panacea for the ills of society, public schooling has come to be
seen as nothing more than a harsh trade-off-one that promises a
benefit to schoolchildren only after exacting a heavy toll on their
physical and psychological well-being.
Perhaps the prospect of judicially imposed liability will finally
prompt schools to entertain serious consideration of school safety.
Some efforts to combat the problem are already underway. North
* Carolina, for example, recently passed legislation making it a felo-
ny to bring a firearm to school.'63 Moreover, three other
states-Florida, Louisiana, and Tennessee-have already adopted
legislation authorizing schools to use metal detectors."6 Used by
over fifty school systems across the nation, metal detectors have
helped to curb the problem of weapons in schools. Strategies used
in other countries also might prove instructive. Calgary, Canada,
for instance, has adapted a block watch program for schools under
which students are encouraged to bring complaints of violence to
the school's attention.' 6'
The right to safe public schooling comports with the estab-
lished constitutional principle that the state must administer consti-
tutionally even those services that it provides only voluntarily."6
The U.S. Supreme Court has held consistently that the state is
under no obligation to provide free education for its citizens. 67
Once the state elects to establish such a system, however, it must
then administer that system in compliance with the Constitu-
tion."6 Because children are compelled to attend public school,
the Constitution entitles them to a safe education. The recent ef-
forts of some states, described above, inspire cautious optimism.
Any affirmative measure is a step in the right direction for public
schools-the only possible direction if the right to an education is
to mean more than an empty promise.
163. Act of July 24, 1993, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 558 (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-269.2).
164. David B. Rubin, Passing Through the "Schoolhouse Gate": Constitutional Implica-
tions of Preserving Student Safety, 154 NJ. LAW., July 1993, at 36, 39.
165. Lamb, supra note 4, at B3.
166. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
167. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
168. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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